















managed	 or	 apparently	 economic	 institutions.	 The	 paper	 situates	 an	 account	 of	 depoliticisation	 in	
terms	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 global	 capitalist	 society,	 and	 seeks	 to	 explore	 how	 imperial	 strategy	 was	
depoliticized	through	the	Sterling	Area.	The	paper	looks	at	an	episode	in	British-Malayan	relations	in	
which	 the	 apolitical	 character	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 is	 brought	 into	 question.	 The	 purpose	 of	 this	








study	of	British	domestic	 politics.	 This	 has	generally	 been	placed	 in	 terms	of	 the	 contradictory	
nexus	within	which	state	management	exists:	between	accumulation	and	legitimation.	Moreover,	
it	 has	 been	 further	 categorised	 into	 institutional,	 rules-based	 and	 discourse	 depoliticisations	
(Flinders	&	Buller	2006).		Authors	have	looked	at	historical	moments	of	depoliticisation,	from	the	
return	to	the	Gold	Standard	(Kettell	2004)	to	IMF	conditionality	 in	1976	(Rogers	2012)	up	to	the	
present	 day,	 including	 the	 ERM	 (Kettell	 2009),	 the	 operational	 independence	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	
England	 (Burnham	 2001),	 the	 discourse	 of	 globalization	 (Hay	 &	 Watson	 1999)	 and	 even	 the	
gendered	discourse	surrounding	the	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	England	(Clarke	&	Roberts	2014).i	
	 The	 impetus	 that	 drives	 a	 depoliticized	 form	 of	 state	 management	 has	 focused	 on	
changes	 in	 international	 finance	 (Burnham	 2001)	 as	 well	 as	 the	 perceptions	 of	 both	 state	
managers	and	their	audience	(Flinders	&	Buller	2006).	Generally	speaking,	this	audience	has	been	
the	 electorate	 of	 the	 state	 in	 question,	 and	 their	 perception	 of	 the	 national	 interest	 (Burnham	
2001,	 128;	 Kettell	 2008,	 631).	 This	 way	 of	 understanding	 depoliticizing	 moves,	 focusing	 on	
domestic	policy,	has	totally	dominated	the	literature	on	the	subject.		
	 Lacking	 from	 the	 existing	 scholarship	 on	 depoliticisation	 is	 an	 appreciation	 of	 how	 the	
target	 audience	 of	 a	 depoliticizing	move	may	 not	 be	 a	 domestic	 one	 but	may	 instead	 be	 the	









section	 will	 seek	 to	 emphasise	 how	 this	 context	 gives	 rise	 not	 only	 to	 the	 tendency	 towards	
depoliticisation	but	also	imperialism.	This	paper	takes	the	view	that	depoliticisation	is	a	means	by	
which	 the	 state	 is	 able	 to	 displace	 the	 political	 character	 of	 government	 policy	 or	 social	




The	 next	 section	 seeks	 to	 provide	 a	 space	 within	 the	 existing	 scholarship	 on	
depoliticisation	 to	 incorporate	 a	 non-domestic	 public	 as	 an	 audience,	 and	 to	 explain	why	 state	
managers	 would	 seek	 to	 depoliticise	 a	 strategy	 of	 imperialism.	 The	 same	 basis	 applies	 to	
depoliticisation	 internationally	 as	 domestically	 and	 so	 the	 state,	 in	 its	 perpetual	 quest	 for	










for	 Britain	 to	 achieve	 its	 international	 economic	 and	 political	 goals	 but	 also	 provided	 a	means	
through	which	British	imperial	economic	policy	could	be	presented	as	an	apparently	neutral	and	
technocratic	 institution.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 was	 a	 method	 through	 which	 Britain	 sought	 to	





Indeed,	 the	 common	 understanding	 of	 depoliticisation	 derives	 from	 seeing	 the	 state	 as	 the	










‘Neither	 legal	 relations	 nor	 political	 forms	 [can]	 be	 comprehended	 whether	 by	
themselves	or	on	 the	basis	of	 a	 so-called	general	 development	of	 the	human	mind,	
but	that	on	the	contrary	they	originate	in	the	material	conditions	of	life…	the	anatomy	




190)	notes,	 the	origins	of	 the	capitalist	state	ultimately	 lie	 in	 the	separation	of	 the	political	and	
economic	 spheres	 of	 human	 social	 life,	 which	 distinguishes	 it	 from	 states	 in	 other	 epochs	 of	
history.	 The	 most	 fundamental	 contradiction	 for	 the	 capitalist	 state	 to	 manage	 is	 to	 seek	 an	
impossible	 reconciliation	 between	 two	 goals:	 accumulation	 and	 legitimation	 (Offe	 1975,	 26;	
Rogers	 2009b,	 636).	 These	 two	 contradictory	 functions	 derive	 from	 the	 crisis-prone	 nature	 of	
capitalist	social	relations	themselves.	On	the	one	hand,	the	state	must	seek	to	maintain	the	circuit	
of	capital,	 for	this	 is	not	 just	how	the	rich	become	richer	but	how	society	as	a	whole	 is	clothed,	
fed,	 sheltered	 and	 so	 forth.	However,	 capitalist	 production	 relies	 on	 the	 exploitation	of	 labour.	
The	circuit	of	capital	does	not	simply	provide,	 it	also	 immiserates.	Ever	greater	 levels	of	surplus	
value	are	sought	and	extracted	from	workers,	wages	are	pushed	down,	overproduction	develops	
and	 crises	 occur.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 very	 basis	 of	 capitalist	 production	 and	 accumulation	
undermines	itself,	delegitimizing	the	state	and	imperiling	the	order	of	society	itself.	However,	the	
state’s	 capacity	 to	 remedy	 this	 also	 undermines	 capitalist	 accumulation:	 by	 raising	 taxes,	
regulating	 the	 labour	market,	 expanding	welfare	provision,	 etc.	 all	 go	 some	way	 to	 imposing	a	
limit	on	the	capacity	of	capital	to	self-valorise.	
	 The	contradictory	nexus	within	and	through	which	the	state	exists	provides	the	context	for	
understanding	how	 state	managers	 formulate	policy.	 Imperialism,	 as	with	depoliticisation,	 also	
emerges	 directly	 from	 these	 conditions;	 however,	 this	 is	 always	 under	 specific	 and	 highly	
contingent	 historical	 circumstances.	 It	 is	 no	 surprise,	 then,	 that	 accounts	 of	 imperialism	 have	
varied	 substantially	 since	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 20th	 Century.	 The	 earlier	 ‘Classical’	 approaches	




a	 distinct	 period	of	 capitalist	 development,	which	 lays	 them	open	 to	 criticism	as	deterministic,	






Instead,	 this	 paper	 situates	 both	 its	 approach	 to	 depoliticisation	 and	 imperialism	 in	 an	
open	Marxist	understanding	of	capitalist	 social	 relations.	This	approach	 ‘sees	 relations	between	
national	 states	 in	 terms	of	 the	 social	 relationships	which	 constitutes	 states	 as	moments	 of	 the	
global	composition	of	class	relations’	(Burnham	1998,	194-5).	As	such,	the	paper	adopts	the	view	






of	 capital-in-general,	 and	 to	 sustain	 the	 national	 and	 global	 circuit	 of	 capital,	 but	 it	 also	 takes	
advantage	 of	 the	 appearance	 of	 a	 domestic/international	 split	 that	 characterizes	 capitalist	
society.	Rather	than	taking	place	in	the	domestic	sphere	of	politics	apparently	‘within’	the	state,	
imperialism	creates	a	particular	 relationship	between	 states.	 It	 is	also	essentially	political.	 In	 the	
parlance	 of	 political	 economists,	 economic	 historians	 and	 public	 policy	 researchers,	 it	 can	 be	
considered	a	 form	of	 international	economic	policy	 (Schenk	1994;	Krozewski	2001;	Hinds	2001;	
Strange;	Burnham	2000;	2006;	Sutton	2015).	This	international	economic	policy	is	formulated	in	









	 To	 see	 a	 strategy	 of	 imperialism	 as	 having	 the	 potential	 to	 be	 depoliticised	 is	
straightforward	enough	–	the	role	that	the	international	realm	as	an	apparent	source	of	external	
discipline	 plays	 in	 the	 legitimation	 of	 state	 policy	 has	 been	well	 studied	 (Hay	 &	Watson	 1999;	
Rogers	2009a,	2009b).	However,	as	with	any	state	policy,	the	contradictions	of	capital	have	not	
been	 solved,	 they	 have	 only	 been	 temporarily	managed.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 imperialism,	 they	 have	
merely	been	geographically	shifted	(Harvey	2003;	2007).		
In	effect,	one	state,	A,	has	coopted	the	capacity	of	another	state,	B,	to	act	in	the	interests	
of	 capital-in-general	 and	 to	ensure	 that	 conditions	 for	 valorization	are	more	 suitable	 in	 its	own	
territory	than	in	B’s.	Exploitation	and	immiseration	are	therefore	shifted	to	state	B	while	surplus	
value	 pours	 into	 A.	 State	 B,	 therefore,	 find	 its	 governing	 autonomy	 and	 potential	 for	 action	
increasingly	 limited	as	 all	 the	 contradictions	of	 capitalism	coalesce	 in	 its	 territory,	 endangering	
the	very	basis	of	this	unequal	relationship.		
	 There	 are	 two	 aspects	 of	 how	 imperialism	 can	 generate	 undesirable	 consequences	 for	





own	 territory,	 may	 become	 aggravated	 or	 aggrieved,	 leading	 to	 social	 unrest,	 governmental	
change,	and	demand	a	fundamental	change	in	the	relationship	between	the	two	states.	As	such,	
state	 A	might	 find	 it	 prudent	 to	 present	 this	 policy	 as	 not	 just	 inevitable	 but	 as	 in	 some	 way	
neutral,	 a	 technocratic	decision	or	 even	benign.	This	 can	 transform	 the	appearance	of	 imperial	
policy	 into	 something	 much	 more	 palatable.	 This,	 then,	 is	 the	 basis	 through	 which	 state	
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managers	would	 seek	 to	depoliticise	 imperialism.	However,	 it	 also	 reveals	 the	audiences	 that	a	














simply,	 a	 means	 by	 which	 state	 managers	 can	 pursue	 policies	 of	 accumulation	 while	
simultaneously	 insulating	themselves	from	the	delegitimation	that	 inherently	follows	from	such	
policies.	 This	 can	 also	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 way	 for	 state	 managers	 to	 court	 credibility,	 and	
competence,	 but	 still	 protect	 themselves	 from	 having	 made	 unpopular	 decisions.	 The	
unexpected,	 and	 apparently	 paradoxical,	 consequence	of	 this	move	 is	 that	 it	 actually	 increases	
the	political	control	of	state	managers,	and	their	autonomy	to	act.	Burnham	(2014,	195)	further	
clarifies	his	seminal	definition	by,	 first,	pointing	out	 that	 that	 it	 is	only	 the	political	character	of	
decision-making	 that	 is	 placed	 at	 one	 remove;	 politics	 can	 never	 truly	 be	 absent	 from	 the	
management	of	the	state,	or	any	aspect	of	society.	Secondly,	depoliticisation	actually	enhances	
political	control	and	autonomy,	whilst	giving	the	appearance	of	the	transfer	of	that	control	to	an	
apparently	 ‘external’	 entity.	 Finally,	 the	 success	 of	 a	 strategy	 of	 depoliticisation	 depends	 on	
achieving	the	appearance	of	transferring	that	control.	
	 As	both	Burnham	(2014)	and	Wood	and	Flinders	(2014)	note,	the	study	of	depoliticisation	
has	 grown	 considerably	 in	 recent	 years;	 however,	 its	 usage	 has	 been	 analytically	 limited.	









	 Traditionally,	 the	 role	 that	 the	 international	 realm	 has	 played	 in	 the	 scholarship	 on	
depoliticisation	 has	 focused	 on	 how	 changes	 in	 the	 international	 order	 have	 provided	 state	
managers	 the	 tools	 to	 depoliticize	 economic	 policy.	 Hay	 &	 Watson	 (1999)	 offer	 an	 excellent	




out	 the	 importance	 of	 understanding	 the	 international	 basis	 behind	 the	 operational	
independence	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 England.	 Rogers	 (2009a,	 2009b)	 gives	 an	 account	 of	 IMF	
conditionality	under	the	Callaghan	government.	While	the	Callaghan	government	was	presented	
as	going	 ‘cap	 in	hand’	 to	 the	 IMF	to	seek	a	bridging	 loan	–	a	 loan	 that	 the	 IMF	was	unsure	was	
necessary.	This	allowed	the	government	to	introduce	strict	economic	policies	that	were	bound	to	
be	unpopular.	Kettell	(2008;	2004a;	2004b),	meanwhile,	provides	us	with	three	historical	episodes	
of	 depoliticisation:	 the	 European	 Exchange	 Rate	 Mechanism,	 the	 Gold	 Standard,	 and	 New	
Labour’s	desire	 for	 the	Euro.	All	 three	 reveal	 the	 reasons	and	value	of	 seeking	an	 international	
institution	to	manage	monetary	and	economic	policy,	and	thus	to	depoliticize	it.		




ideological	 structures	 of	 capitalist	 society.	 In	 our	 society,	 politics	 and	 economics	 are	 seen	 as	
separable,	if	not	always	separate,	spheres	of	social	life.	Similarly,	the	national	state-form	is	seen	
as	the	essence	of	daily	political	life,	transforming	international	politics	into	a	completely	separate	
realm	 of	 political	 life	 that	 is	 outside	 the	 normal	 channels	 of	 political	 contestation.	 This	 is	 the	
ideological	 conceit	 that	allows	 strategies	of	depoliticisation	 in	 these	 instances	 to	 succeed:	 they	
are	seen	as	‘external’	institutions	that	constrain	and	limit	possibility	in	domestic	politics.	
	 These	examples	of	depoliticisation,	however,	all	 focus	on	a	domestic,	national	audience.	
The	 state	 managers	 in	 these	 examples,	 understanding	 the	 depoliticizing	 nature	 of	 the	
international	realm	and	its	institutions,	have	sought	to	manipulate	them	for	their	own	ends.	With	
the	exception	of	the	Hay	&	Watson	(1999)	piece,	which	covers	a	discourse-based	depoliticisation,	
the	 above	 examples	 offer	 studies	 of	 institution-based	 depoliticisation.	 Rules-based	
depoliticisation	 can	 be	 found	 quite	 readily	 in	 the	 1990s,	 with	 both	 the	 Major	 and	 Blair	
governments	 use	 of	 inflation	 targets,	 Gordon	 Brown’s	 so-called	 ‘Golden’	 and	 sustainable	
investment	rules,	as	well	as	the	‘Five	Economic	Tests’	for	British	adoption	of	the	Euro.	
	 Kettell	 (2008,	 635),	 in	 assessing	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 a	 strategy	 of	 depoliticisation,	






a	 depoliticisation	 policy	 can	 only	 be	 achieved	 through	 a	 process	 of	 considered	 debate	 and	
reasoned	discussion	of	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 the	 specific	 context	 of	 the	policy	
itself’.	 The	 theoretical	 foundations	 for	 an	 account	 of	 the	 depoliticisation	 of	 imperialism	 can	
already	 be	 found	 in	 the	 extant	 scholarship	 on	 depoliticisation.	 By	 the	 very	 fact	 that	 state	
managers	can	appeal	to	‘the	international’	either	as	international	institutions	or	phenomena,	this	
fantastical	 realm	 has	 had	 the	 potential	 to	 depoliticize	 even	 the	 most	 nefarious	 of	 state-led	








a	 ‘twofold	 life’	 between	 the	 state	 and	 society:	 a	 political	 realm,	 and	 an	 apolitical	 realm	 of	
economic,	 or	 civil,	 intercourse.	 Apparently	 separated,	 the	 state	 and	 society	 appear	 as	
autonomous	entities	whilst	actually	being	essentially	united	as	capitalist	society.		
It	 is	 in	 fact	 that	 capitalism	 appears	 different	 to	 reality	 that	 enables	 a	 strategy	 of	
depoliticisation	 to	 function.	 However,	 the	 state	 is	 regularly	 forced	 to	 intervene	 visibly	 in	 the	
running	of	society	to	manage	class	relations.	As	Burnham	(2014,	197)	notes,		
‘Although	 a	 central	 aim	 of	 depoliticisation	 strategies	 is	 to	 convince	 key	 actors	 that	
state	managers	 are,	 to	 an	 extent,	 disengaged	 from	policy	making	 and	 delivery,	 the	
reorganisation	 of	 class	 relations	 periodically	 calls	 for	 the	 substantive	 and	 public	
intervention	of	the	state’	
A	 strategy	of	 imperialism	 is	 such	a	direct	 intervention	of	one	 state	 into	 the	 running	of	 another	
state.	While	both	are	reified	and	fetishized	forms	of	capitalist	society,	both	states	exist,	at	 least	
fantastically,	 as	 essentially	 political	 entities	 and	 so	 their	 actions	 are	 perceived	 as	 politically	
contestable.		
Since	 the	 justification	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 states	 is	 as	 apparently	 autonomous	 entities	
from	 the	 global	 economy	 and	 each	 other,	 the	 use	 of	 a	 strategy	 of	 imperialism	 imperils	 this	
justification,	 thus	 undermining	 the	 political	 justification	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 state.	 As	
Bonefeld	 (2014,	 203)	 notes,	 ‘every	 state	 is	 an	 entrepreneur	 of	memory	 to	 legitimize	 itself	 and	
justify	 its	 policies	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 nation	 and	 the	 national	 interest.’	 However,	 through	 the	
imperialist	actions	of	one	state,	 the	particular	national	character	of	another	state,	 justified	with	
various	 patriotic	 and	 nationalist	 ideologies,	 is	 also	 undermined,	 thereby	 not	 only	 causing	
problems	for	state	managers	of	the	dominated	state,	but	also	 its	people,	whose	exploitation	by	
capital	 is	 obfuscated	 by	 nationalist	 ideologies	 and	 manifest	 as	 an	 anti-imperial	 and	 anti-
government	 sentiment.	 Indeed,	 this	 is	 the	 process	 through	 which	 imperialism,	 the	 direct	
intervention	 of	 one	 state	 into	 the	 workings	 of	 another,	 politicizes	 economic	 conditions	 and	
policymaking.	
The	 intervention	of	one	state	 into	the	territory	of	another,	by	an	act	of	 imperialism,	 is	a	




strategy	 of	 imperialism	 can	 cause	 significant	 unrest	 in	 the	 territory	 of	 the	 state	 that	 has	 been	
subordinated,	 as	 well	 as	 leaving	 state	 managers	 in	 the	 subordinated	 state	 vulnerable	 to	 this	
unrest.	 It	 is	 easy	 to	 see,	 then,	 how	 depoliticisation	 can	 be	 a	 useful	 addition	 to	 a	 strategy	 of	
imperialism.	
Therefore,	 the	 use	 of	 depoliticisation	 may	 be	 helpful	 in	 transforming	 a	 strategy	 of	
imperialism	 into	an	apparently	necessary	or	 incontestable	event.	The	 institution	of	 the	Sterling	
Area,	as	well	as	the	discourse	surrounding	exchange	control	laws	in	the	Area,	are	therefore	good	
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as	 Burnham	 (2001,	 134)	 notes,	 ‘the	 stronger	 (and	 more	 distant)	 the	 set	 of	 ‘rules’,	 the	 greater	
maneuverability	the	state	will	achieve,	increasing	the	likelihood	of	attaining	objectives.’	Burnham	
(ibid.,	 131)	 also	 identifies	 the	 shift	 from	 nebulous	 international	 cooperation	 to	 a	 more	 fixed	
regional	integration	in	the	early	1990s	key	characteristics	of	depoliticized	management.	
	 As	both	Kettell	 (2004;	 2008)	 and	Rogers	 (2009a;	 2009b)	 show,	 international	 institutions	
were	 able	 to	 depoliticize	 economic	 policy	 far	 before	 the	 1990s.	 However,	 while	 these	 authors	
account	for	the	depoliticizing	effect	these	institutions	provided	for	domestic	economic	policy,	this	
paper	 contends	 that	 these	 institutions	 can	 also	 depoliticize	 international	 economic	 policy.	 This	
section	 of	 the	 paper	 will	 look	 at	 the	 depoliticizing	 capacity	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 which	 is	
challenged	during	a	debacle	over	exchange	control	 laws	 in	Singapore	 in	 late	1955.	The	Sterling	
Area,	 this	 section	will	 argue,	was	 able	 to	 distance	 the	 political	 character	 of	 British	 imperialism	
while	also	enhancing	market	credibility.	
	 The	 official	 history	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 as	 recorded	 in	 an	 unpublished	 Foreign	 Office	
paper	written	by	Allen	Christelow,	under-secretary	to	the	Treasury	at	the	time,	declares	that	 its	
existence	was	concomitant	with	the	extension	of	British	sovereignty	throughout	the	19th	century	
(TNA	FO371/82915,	The	Sterling	Area,	24th	 January	1950).	 It	was	a	 region	within	which	Sterling	
was	 used	 as	 a	 means	 of	 exchange,	 and	 within	 which	 UK	 banks	 operated.	 This	 official	 history	
maintained	 that	 the	Sterling	Area	grew	naturally	 as	 a	 result	 of	Britain’s	 political	 and	 economic	











in	 a	 trading	 area	 approximating	 the	 British	 Empire	 and	 Dominions,	 which	 would	 have	 low,	
reciprocal	tariffs	for	internal	trade	and	high	tariffs	for	any	external	trade	outside	of	the	area,	the	




Area	 as	 a	 means	 of	 exchange	 control.	 These	 exchange	 controls	 were	 copied	 throughout	 the	
Sterling	Area	and	resulted	in	the	Treasury	maintaining	a	monopoly	of	all	gold	and	foreign	reserves	
within	 the	 Sterling	 Area.	 These	 controls	 prohibited	 payments	 to	 all	 non-residents	 without	
permission	 of	 the	 Treasury,	 and	 allowed	 the	 Treasury	 ‘to	 exercise	 control	 over	 all	 securities	
marketable	 abroad	 and	 to	 compel	 their	 registration	 with	 a	 view	 to	 compulsory	 requisition	 by	
HMG’.	This	was	the	creation	of	the	‘dollar	pool’	and	the	exact	nature	of	the	Sterling	Area	after	the	




Area	after	 the	war	could	be	characterised	by	 three	 features:	 	 ‘members	pegged	 their	exchange	
rates	 to	 sterling,	 maintained	 a	 common	 exchange	 control	 against	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world	 while	
enjoying	 free	 current	 and	 capital	 transactions	 with	 the	 UK	 and,	 thirdly,	 maintained	 national	
reserves	 in	sterling	which	required	pooling	foreign	exchange	earnings.’	The	principal	purpose	of	
the	exchange	controls,	however,	should	be	seen	in	terms	of	the	post-war	dollar	shortage:	these	
controls	 were	 intended	 to	 restrict	 convertibility	 of	 Sterling	 into	 dollars.	 Due	 to	 the	 trade	
imbalance	between	the	US	and	the	rest	of	the	world,	and	without	these	controls,	British	gold	and	




1990).	 As	 such,	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 was	 essential	 to	 Britain’s	 continued	 economic	 vitality	 and	
without	 it,	 harsh	 austerity	measures	 would	 have	 been	 necessary,	 bringing	 the	 entire	 post-war	
consensus	into	doubt.	













Indeed,	 the	 system	was	 so	 delicate	 and	 needed	 so	much	 support	 that	 plans	 like	 ROBOT	were	
seriously	considered.viii	The	Sterling	Area,	then,	can	be	understood	as	a	means	through	which	the	
British	 state	 was	 able	 to	 support	 its	 reserve	 position	 through	 the	 pooling	 of	 foreign	 currency,	
particularly	US	dollars,	and	gold.	These	reserves	were	used	to	support	the	value	of	Sterling	and	
the	 imports	 that	 were	 necessary	 to	 enable	 Britain’s	 postwar	 reconstruction	 (Burnham	 1990).	
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British	 policy,	 these	 laws	 prevented	 the	 convertibility	 of	 Sterling	 without	 the	 approval	 of	 the	
British	 state,	 as	 well	 as	 required	 the	 pooling	 of	 foreign	 currency	 earned	 by	 the	 sale	 of	
commodities	and	services	from	member	states,	by	the	Bank	of	England	in	the	EEA	(Schenk	1994,	
130).	Once	pooled	 in	 the	EEA,	 this	 foreign	 currency	pool	 became,	 for	 all	 intents	 and	purposes,	
Britain’s	 foreign	 currency	 reserves.	As	 such,	 it	 is	 generally	well	 accepted	 that	 the	Sterling	Area	
was	not	just	a	mechanism	for	imperial	economic	policy	but	that	it	was	an	international	institution	
(Schenk	 1994,	 135).	 Indeed,	much	of	 the	 literature	on	British	 imperial	 economic	policy	 and	 the	
Sterling	Area	 treats	 the	empire	and	 the	Area	as	a	monolithic	 institution	 (Bell	 1958;	Hinds	1987,	
1999,	2001;	Krozewski	1993,	2001;	Schenk	1994,	1996);	however,	this	remains	a	problematic	view	
in	that	it	fetishes	British	imperialism,	making	it	‘thing-like’	–	an	‘empire’	–	and	thus	side-lines	the	
need	 for	 critical	 analysis	 of	 relations	 between	 specific	 states	 (Sutton	 2015,	 9-15).	 In	 effect,	 in	
treating	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 or	 the	 British	 Empire,	 as	 things	 themselves	 obfuscates	 the	 social	
relations	 that	 created	 them,	 and	 is	 manifested	 through	 them.	 Moreover,	 as	 has	 been	 noted	
elsewhere	 (Krozewski	 1997,	 850;	 Darwin	 2002;	 Sutton	 2015,	 15),	 this	 kind	 of	 analysis	 has	 the	
unfortunate	consequence	of	accepting	a	dichotomy	between	politics	and	economics.	
Considering	 the	 specific	 imperial	 relationships	 between	 Britain	 and	 other	 states	 reveals	
considerable	variation.	Malaya	was	one	of	the	principal	dollar	earners	for	the	Sterling	Area’s	dollar	
pool,	 and	 hence	 one	 of	 the	 main	 supports	 for	 Britain’s	 post-war	 economy.	 Malaya	 was	 the	
Sterling	Area’s	largest	dollar	earner	through	its	sale	of	natural	rubber	and	tin	to	the	US,	with	a	net	










the	 collective	 dollar	 earnings	 of	 Malaya	 as	 a	 bargaining	 chip	 in	 any	 future	 constitutional	
settlement	by	deliberately	politicising	Singapore’s	exchange	control	laws.	Given	the	nature	of	the	
constitutional	 arrangement	between	 the	governments	of	Singapore	and	Malaya,	whatever	one	
government	chose	to	do	had	enormous	repercussions	on	the	other.	As	a	 result	of	 this,	 too,	 the	
Bank	of	England	considered	both	their	economies	and	external	trade	as	only	fully	comprehensible	
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as	 a	 single	 whole	 (BE	 OV65/5,	 Federation	 of	 Malaya:	 Sterling	 Assets,	 Trade	 and	 Balance	 of	
Payments,	24	January	1957).	
At	 the	 upcoming	 Constitutional	 Talks	 in	 1956,	 he	 intended	 to	 press	 Britain	 for	 early	
independence	 for	 Singapore	 in	 1957	 (TNA	 CO1030/100,	 Telegram	 no.143,	 9	 November	 1955).	
However,	Marshall	 expected	 this	 to	 be	 dismissed	 out	 of	 hand	 and	 that	was	why	 he	wished	 to	
make	an	issue	of	the	exchange	control	ordinance.		
‘The	only	weapon	to	hand	was	the	Malayan	dollar	surplus	and	so	he	proposed	to	use	
that	 by	 deliberately	 and	 openly	 threatening	 to	 deny	 its	 use	 to	 the	 Sterling	
Commonwealth	by	 the	abandonment	of	exchange	control	 if	he	did	not	get	what	he	
wanted	on	the	political	front.’	(TNA	CO1030/100,	Telegram	no.687,	7	November	1955)		
Marshall	 stated	 his	 intention	 to	 renew	 Singapore’s	 exchange	 control	 ordinance	 for	 six	
months	only,	which	was	half	 the	usual	 time	 (TNA	CO1030/100,	Exchange	Control,	 9	November	
1955).	 In	 fact,	Marshall	 explicitly	 stated	 to	 the	Governor	of	Singapore	 that	 ‘he	wanted	 to	put	a	
loaded	pistol	on	the	table	knowing	that	the	Secretary	of	State	and	sterling	Commonwealth	could	
never	 let	 him	 use	 it’	 (TNA	 FCO141/7437,	 Telegram	 from	 High	 Commissioner	 of	 Federation	 to	
Colonial	 Office,	 7	 November	 1955).	 Marshall’s	 demand	 then,	 as	 understood	 by	 the	 High	
Commissioner	of	the	Federation,	was	either	to	receive	early	self-government	or	force	the	British	
to	 renew	 exchange	 controls	 by	 fiat	 and	 to	 dismiss	 him,	 thereby	 strengthening	 his	 political	
position	in	Singapore	in	terms	of	his	‘fight	for	[Singapore’s]	freedom’	(ibid.).	The	Prime	Minister,	
Anthony	Eden,	declared	Marshall’s	move	as	‘blackmail’	(TNA	CO1030/100,	Philip	de	Zulueta	to	JB	




Marshall	 had	 formed	only	a	minority	government	 in	Singapore	and	his	political	position	
was	weak.	One	means	of	establishing	his	credentials	as	a	true	leader	of	Singapore,	with	the	city’s	
interests	 at	 heart,	 was	 by	 seeking	 an	 economics	 adviser	 from	 the	 IMF	 to	 replace	 the	 Bank	 of	
England’s	appointee,	JB	Loynes.	Marshall	argued	that	Loynes	would	never	act	in	Malaya’s	interest	
unless	 it	 was	 also	 in	 Britain’s	 or,	 particularly,	 the	 Bank’s	 interests.	 It	 was	 widely	 believed	 in	
Malayan	political	circles	that,	while	the	Colonial	Office	had	Malaya’s	best	 interests	at	heart,	the	




The	 British	 state,	 in	 response	 to	Marshall’s	 position,	 tried	 to	 convince	 him	 of	 the	 good	
reasons	 to	 retain	 exchange	 controls,	 as	well	 as	 the	 value	 of	 the	 Sterling	Area.	MacGillivray,	 in	










Marshall	 had	 already	 sought	 Abdul	 Rahman’s,	 the	 Chief	 Minister	 of	 the	 Federation,	
support	at	the	Joint	Ministers	Conference	and,	indeed,	there	was	support	in	the	Federation	due	to	
the	 widespread	 belief	 that	 Malaya	 would	 do	 well	 out	 of	 leaving	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 (TNA	







• The	 Central	 Bank	 proposed	 by	 the	 IBRD	 mission	 would	 give	 Malaya	 further	 financial	












however,	Marshall	was	 uninterested	 in	 the	 technical	 considerations	 of	 his	 arguments	 –	 he	was	





Malaya’s	 membership	 in	 the	 Sterling	 Area	 would	 shift	 entirely	 from	 an	 economic	 issue	 into	 a	




In	 other	 words,	 the	 British	 state	 continued	 to	 see	 the	 key	 basis	 for	 maintaining	 Malaya’s	





for	 Malaya	 to	 stay	 in	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 the	 more	 convinced,	 of	 course,	 the	 Chief	
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Minister	may	 become	 that	 he	 has	 a	 powerful	 weapon	 and	 therefore	 he	will	 be	 the	
more	 determined	 to	 use	 it	 politically.’	 (TNA	 CO1030/100,	 Exchange	 Control,	 9	
November	1955)		





uncertainty.	 If	 I…	 prolong	 the	 Ordinance	 for	 one	 year,	 then	 there	 is	 the	 strong	
possibility	 of	 a	 constitutional	 crisis.	 Such	 a	 crisis	 would	 also,	 of	 course,	 arise	 if	 the	
Ordinance	 were	 extended	 for	 6	 months	 now,	 and	 has	 to	 be	 extended	 without	 the	
Ministers’	 agreement	 after	 June	 next	 year.	Mr	Marshall	 could	 obviously	make	 great	
political	 play	 with	 the	 “British	 government’s	 greater	 regard	 for	 sterling	 than	 for	
Singapore’s	 self-government”,	 etc.	 etc.’	 (TNA	 FCO141/7437,	 From	 Governor	 of	
Singapore	to	Colonial	Secretary,	9	November	1955)	
In	Black’s	words,	 this	 comes	 across	 as	 a	 dilemma	of	 politicisation:	 either	 the	British	 state	does	
intervene	and	politicise	the	whole	system	of	exchange	controls,	and	thus	the	basis	of	the	Sterling	
Area	 itself,	 or	 do	 nothing	 and	 reduce	 the	 state’s	 market	 credibility	 quite	 substantially.	 Black	
further	elaborated	on	the	point	of	market	credibility	by	pointing	out	 that	 ‘absence	of	exchange	
control	 in	 the	 present	 climate	 of	 political	 and	 economic	 uncertainty	 of	 the	 area	would	 put	 the	
local	 economy	 at	 the	 mercy	 of	 local	 and	 external	 speculators	 in	 the	 Malayan	 currency.	 The	
Federation	would	almost	certainly	be	unable	in	such	circumstances	to	prevent	a	flight	of	capital’	
(ibid.).	Clearly	understood	and	articulated	here,	then,	by	British	state	managers	are	the	negative	
consequences	 associated	 with	 the	 failure	 to	 depoliticise	 the	 imperial	 character	 of	 the	 Sterling	
Area,	which	would	have	been	severe.	
Sir	 Hilton	 Poynton,	 Deputy	 Under-Secretary	 at	 the	 Colonial	 Office,	 underlined	 the	
importance	of	the	whole	situation,	to	Leslie	Rowan,	the	head	of	the	Overseas	Finance	division	at	
the	Treasury.	
‘I	 think	 you	 will	 agree	 that	 refusal	 by	 Singapore	 and	 the	 Federation	 to	 continue	
exchange	control	amounts	 in	effect	to	the	withdrawal	 (or	expulsion)	of	Malaya	from	
the	 Sterling	 Area.	 However	 alarming	 this	 may	 be	 to	 the	 UK	 and	 the	 [rest	 of	 the	
Sterling	 Area]	 I	 think	 it	 would	 be	 tactically	 unwise	 to	 let	 Marshall	 think	 we	 were	
alarmed	on	this	ground	since	it	would	enhance	the	value	of	this	manoeuvre	in	his	eyes	







further	 extension	 after	 the	 six	months;	 however,	 he	warned	 that	 both	 courses	 of	 action	would	







advice	 sought	 by	 the	 Colonial	Office	 from	 the	 Bank	was	 clarification	 as	 to	whether	 the	 British	
government	 could	 afford	 to	 call	 Marshall’s	 bluff,	 or	 if	 Britain	 was	 required	 to	 stop	 it	 as	 the	
dominant	state	of	the	Sterling	Area.	The	Colonial	Office	also	asked	for	a	document	detailing	the	
merits	 of	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 and	 the	 demerits	 of	 leaving	 to	 join	 another	 currency	 bloc	 (TNA	
CO1030/100,	AH	Poynton	to	Sir	Leslie	Rowan	(SECRET),	16	November	1955).	
‘What	seems	to	us	to	be	needed	is	a	paper	written	in	simple	language	for	the	layman,	
divided	perhaps	 into	 two	parts:	 the	 first	would	 set	out	 the	 very	meagre	advantages	
which	would	accrue	to	Malaya	if	she	were	to	ally	herself	with	the	US	dollar;	the	second	










Given	 the	 determination	 of	 Lennox-Boyd	 to	 only	 discuss	 the	 situation	 as	 an	 economic	
matter,	 and	 to	maintain	 there	would	 be	 no	 alternative	 but	 for	 Singapore	 to	 leave	 the	 Sterling	
Area,	 there	 was	 a	 strong	 desire	 by	 British	 state	managers	 to	 prevent	 this	matter	 becoming	 a	
contestable	political	issue.	Again,	the	politicisation	of	exchange	controls	was	something	that	Alan	
Lennox-Boyd,	 the	 Colonial	 Secretary,	 was	 explicitly	 eager	 to	 avoid.	 In	 a	 telegram	 to	 the	 High	




inimical	 to	 a	 cool	 and	 dispassionate	 examination	 of	 such	 technical	 aspects	 of	 the	














Lennox-Boyd	 remained	 hopeful	 that	 MacGillivray	 would	 see	 success	 in	 his	 efforts	 to	
persuade	 ministers	 not	 to	 pursue	 threats	 to	 abandon	 exchange	 controls	 in	 Singapore,	 or	 the	




23	 November	 1955).	 However,	 he	 also	 asked	 MacGillivray	 to	 emphasise	 that	 linking	 the	 two	
subjects	 for	 political	 or	 constitutional	 progress	 could	 lead	 to	 catastrophe	 economically	 and	
politically	 (ibid.).	 Indeed,	 Lennox-Boyd	 told	 MacGillivray	 that	 even	 the	 minimum	measures	 to	





(SECRET),	 29	 November	 1955).	 In	 essence,	 it	 would	 have	 consequences	 that	 were	 almost	
synonymous	with	Malaya’s	withdrawal	 from	the	Sterling	Area;	however,	British	state	managers	
were	adamant	that	this	outcome	would	not	occur.	
Above	 all,	 Lennox-Boyd	 was	 hopeful	 that	 Federation	 Ministers	 were	 deterred	 from	
Marshall’s	 proposed	 course	 of	 action	 by	 the	 economic	 arguments	made,	 and	 that	 they	 would	
therefore	 not	 support	 Marshall’s	 proposal.	 MacGillivray	 wrote	 back	 to	 Lennox-Boyd	 two	 days	
later	to	tell	him	that	he	had	met	with	Abdul	Rahman.	Rahman	had	told	him	that	the	Federation	
was	extremely	unlikely	to	support	Marshall’s	proposal,	though	Marshall	was	coming	to	see	him	on	
the	 26th	November	 to	 discuss	 the	 issue	with	 Rahman	 (TNA	CO1030/100,	 Exchange	Control,	 25	
November	1955).	
	 MacGillivray	 also	 relayed	 that	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Singapore	 Executive	 Council	 had	
informed	 him	 they	 intended	 to	 renew	 exchange	 controls	 for	 another	 year	 due	 to	 the	




idea’	 (TNA	CO1030/100,	Telegram	no.156,	 29	November	 1955;	 FCO141/7437,	 From	Governor	of	
Singapore	to	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Colonies,	29	November	1955).	
	 Despite	 the	 eventual	 climb-down	 from	 Marshall’s	 initial	 position,	 Britain’s	 strategic	
interests,	the	role	of	the	Sterling	Area,	and	the	fear	of	British	state	managers	that	it	be	politicised	
are	 all	 highlighted	 by	 this	 episode.	 Marshall’s	 goal	 was	 to	 ‘weaponise’	 Singapore’s	 exchange	
controls	 as	 a	 political	 tool	 for	 the	 constitutional	 talks	 for	 Singapore’s	 eventual	 independence.	
However,	had	this	been	successful,	 it	would	have	brought	the	exchange	controls	into	a	realm	of	
political	dispute,	politicising	not	only	their	 role	 in	 the	Sterling	Area	and	the	Area	 itself,	but	also	
creating	an	atmosphere	of	economic	uncertainty	and	undermining	market	credibility.	
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	 Ultimately,	Marshall’s	gamble	 failed	due	to	his	 reliance	on	the	Federation	to	support	his	
position.	British	state	managers,	knowing	this	weakness	 in	his	position,	 realised	 it	was	 the	only	
reasonable	option	to	undermine	him.	However,	by	this	time,	British	state	managers	had	revealed	
how	concerned	they	were	that	Malaya’s	dollar	earnings	might	be	might	be	brought	into	question,	
generating	 a	 number	of	 arguments	 for	Malaya	 to	 remain	 committed	 to	 the	Area.	This	 episode	
also	reveals	that	British	state	managers	relied	on	the	technical	nature	of	the	Area’s	structure	to	
depoliticise	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 which	 was,	 in	 effect,	 a	 long-term	 aspect	 of	 imperial	 economic	
policy.	
While	Wood	and	Flinders	(2014,	153)	are	critical	of	a	‘narrow	state-centric’	approach,	their	





transform	 exchange	 control	 from	 a	 depoliticized	 aspect	 of	 economic	 policy	 to	 a	 much	 more	
discretionary	 tool.	 This	 was	 a	 political	 gamble	 in	 order	 to	 develop	 an	 even	 greater	 level	 of	
governing	 autonomy	 and	 to	 preserve	 his	 own	 political	 position.	 Indeed,	 after	 the	 London	
negotiations,	Marshall	was	forced	to	resign	his	position	as	Chief	Minister,	declaring	that	he	had	
failed	in	his	mission	to	achieve	independence	for	Singapore.	
	In	 this	 instance,	 however,	 that	 governing	 autonomy	 related	 not	 only	 to	 a	 domestic	
audience	but	also	 to	 the	British	 state.	Marshall	also	 sought	 to	bring	attention	 to	 the	 inherently	
unequal	nature	of	the	Sterling	Area’s	organization	and	purpose.	The	goal	of	this	politicization	was	
to	 leverage	 speedier	 independence	 for	 Singapore,	 as	well	 as	 to	 sure	 up	 his	 own	weak	 political	






how	 either	 international	 institutions	 or	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 globalization	 can	 be	 introduced	 to	




international	 competition.	 The	 consequences	 of	 these	 actions	 can	 be	 ill	 will	 from	 other	 state	
managers,	or	unrest	from	the	population	of	another	state.	
This	 article	 adopted	 an	 open	 Marxist	 approach	 to	 the	 state,	 upon	 which	 it	 based	 an	












to	 politicize	 them,	 showing	 that	 a	 strategy	 of	 depoliticisation	 is	 not	 a	 holy	 grail	 for	 state	
managers.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 understood	 in	 historically	 specific	 and	 conditioned	
circumstances.	As	noted	by	Burnham	(2014,	204)	‘depoliticisation	strategies	remain	an	important,	
yet	 inherently	 contradictory,	 element	 in	 the	 armoury	 of	 state	 managers	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
preservation	of	individual	governments	and,	in	principle,	of	the	capitalist	form	of	the	state	itself.’	
For	British	state	managers,	a	key	aspect	of	successfully	managing	the	Sterling	Area	after	
the	 Second	 World	 War	 was	 through	 placing	 its	 political	 character	 at	 one	 remove	 from	 the	
international	economic	policies	that	crafted	it.	This	becomes	apparent	from	the	reaction	of	British	
state	managers	 to	Marshall’s	attempt	 to	politicise	 the	exchange	control	 laws	 that	provided	 the	
legal	basis	 for	 the	Sterling	Area	as	a	 currency	bloc.	Marshall,	 despite	 realizing	his	position	as	a	
relative	 non-entity	 in	 imperial	 politics,	 was	 still	 able	 to	 highlight	 the	 political	 character	 of	 the	
Sterling	Area	through	his	actions.		
While	this	paper	has	focused	mainly	on	British	state	managers	in	their	efforts	to	maintain	
a	 historic	 strategy	 of	 imperialism	 through	 its	 depoliticisation,	 there	 is	 another	 story	 to	 be	 told	
about	the	goals	of	Malayan	and	Singaporean	state	managers.	State	managers	in	the	Federation	
of	 Malaya	 were	 eager	 to	 maintain	 the	 status	 quo;	 however,	 whether	 this	 was	 because	 they	
accepted	 the	 arguments	made	by	British	 state	managers	or	 if	 they	 too	wanted	 to	displace	 the	
political	 character	 of	 British	 imperial	 is	 unclear	 from	 National	 Archives	 documents.	 Certainly,	
however,	Saul	Marshall’s	considered	goal	was	to	politicise	British	imperialism.	This	points	to	the	
dynamic	 nature	 of	 imperial	 relations	 and	 how	 important	 historical	 enquiry	 is	 to	 the	 study	 of	
imperialism.	 As	 Marx	 ([1867]	 1975,	 179)	 famously	 remarked,	 though	 talking	 about	 the	 capital	
relation,	 imperialism	 is	 not	 a	 necessary	 or	 transhistorical	 phenomenon	 but	 one	 that	 is	 highly	
contingent	 and	historically	 specific.	Historical	 study	 of	 such	 episodes	 in	British	 imperial	 history	
reveals	 the	 contested	 nature	 of	 imperial	 relations:	 they	 are	 fraught	with	 tension,	 contradiction	
and	conflict	but	also	collaboration	and	cooperation.	While	Federation	state	managers	were	happy	
to	 accept	 Britain’s	 arguments,	 Saul	 Marshall	 was	 only	 made	 more	 determined	 by	 them.	
Understanding	their	respective	positions	cannot	be	intuited	solely	by	reference	to	capitalist	social	





rejecting	 a	 substantial	 distinction	 between	 formal	 and	 informal	 empire.	 This	 point	 has	
consequences	 for	 two	 further	 groups	 of	 literature:	 Global	 Governance ix ,	 and	 the	 New	
Imperialismx.	Both	maintain	that	the	state	has	reduced	considerably	its	scope	in,	respectively,	the	































Bonefeld	W,	Brown	A	 and	Burnham	P	 (1996)	A	Major	Crisis:	 the	Politics	 of	 Economic	Policy	 in	
Britain	in	the	1990s	
Bonefeld	 W,	 Gunn	 R,	 Holloway	 J	 and	 Psychopedis	 K	 (eds)	 (1995)	 Open	 Marxism	 Volume	 III:	
Emancipating	Marx	London:	Pluto	Press.		
Bonefeld	 W,	 Gunn	 R,	 Holloway	 J	 and	 Psychopedis	 K	 (eds)	 (1992b)	 Open	 Marxism	 Volume	 II:	
Theory	and	Practice	London:	Pluto	Press.		

































Clarke,	Simon	 (1978)	Capital,	Fractions	of	Capital,	and	the	State:	 ‘Neo-Marxist’	Analaysis	of	 the	
South	African	State	Capital	&	Class	5	
Darwin	J	 (2002)	Review	of	Money	and	the	End	of	Empire:	British	 International	Economic	Policy	
and	 the	 Colonies,	 1947–1958	 by	 Gerold	 Krozewski,	 and	 Britain’s	 Sterling	 Colonial	 Policy	 and	
Decolonisation,	1939–1958	by	Allister	Hinds	The	Journal	of	Economic	History	62:4	
Finkelstein	LS	(1995)	What	is	Global	Governance?	Global	Governance	1:3		








































Luxemburg	 R	 ([1951]	 1963)	 The	 Accumulation	 of	 Capital	 (trans.	 Schwarzchild	 A)	 London:	
Routledge		




















Rogers	 C	 (2009b)	 From	 Social	 Contract	 to	 ‘Social	 Contrick’:	 The	 Depoliticisation	 of	 Economic	
Policy	Making	under	Harold	Wilson,	1974-75	British	Journal	of	Politics	and	International	Relations	
11:4	
Schenk	C	 (1994)	 Britain	 and	 the	 Sterling	Area:	 from	Devaluation	 to	 Convertibility	 in	 the	 1950s	
London:	Routledge	
Schenk	 C	 (1996)	 Finance	 and	 Empire:	 Confusions	 and	 Complexities:	 A	 Note	 The	 International	
History	Review	18:4		
Scholte,	JA	(2002)	Civil	Society	and	Democracy	in	Global	Governance	Global	Governance	8:3	
Stone	 D	 (2008)	 Global	 Public	 Policy,	 Transnational	 Policy	 Communities,	 and	 Their	 Networks.	
Policy	Studies	Journal	36	
Strange	 S	 (1971)	 Sterling	 and	 British	 Policy:	 A	 Political	 Study	 of	 an	 International	 Currency	 in	
Decline	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press	
Strange	 S	 (1996)	 The	 Retreat	 of	 the	 State:	 The	 Diffusion	 of	 Power	 in	 the	 World	 Economy	
Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press	
Sutton	A	(2013)	Towards	an	Open	Marxist	Theory	of	Imperialism	Capital	&	Class	37:2	
Sutton	 A	 (2015)	 The	 Political	 Economy	 of	 Imperial	 Relations:	 Britain,	 the	 Sterling	 Area,	 and	
Malaya	1945-1960	Basingstoke:	Palgrave	
The	National	Archives,	Kew	










Wood	 M	 &	 Flinders	 M	 (2014)	 Rethinking	 Depoliticisation:	 Beyond	 the	 Governmental	 Policy	 &	
Politics	42:2	
																																																									
i	It	 is	 also	worth	 noting	 that	 depoliticisation	has	 even	 entered	 the	 cultural	 lexicon,	with	 it	 being	directly	
satirised	 in	 the	 BBC	 television	 show	 The	 Thick	 of	 It	 special	 ‘Rise	 of	 the	 Nutters’,	 in	 which	 the	 Prime	
Minister’s	 legacy	 project	 is	 to	 create	 a	 technocratic	 body	 to	 manage	 immigration,	 thus	 removing	
immigration	from	political	debate.	
ii	See,	 for	 example,	Hay	&	Watson	 (1999),	 Burnham	 (2001),	 Kettell	 (2004,	 2009),	 Rogers	 (2009a;	 2009b;	
2012)	
iii	A	 common	 criticism	 of	 the	 open	 Marxist	 approach	 to	 the	 state	 has	 been	 that	 it	 offers	 a	 de	 facto	
functionalist	analysis.	See	Bieler	&	Morton	(2003),	Bieler	et	al.	(2010)	and	Tsolakis	(2010)	for	examples	of	













breaking	 the	 government’s	 international	 and	 domestic	 economic	 commitments.	 It	 was	 named	 after	 its	
main	proponents	 in	the	Treasury	and	Bank:	Leslie	Rowan,	George	Bolton	and	Otto	Clarke.	See	Bulpitt	&	
Burnham	(1999)	and	Burnham	(2003)	for	further	information	on	ROBOT.	
ix	See,	for	example,	Finkelstein	(1995),	Strange	(1996),	Scholte	(2002),	Stone	(2008)	
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